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engaged the attention of the subtlest and most profound intellects,
could in this, its most important, intricate and technical departme nt,
be brought down to the general comprehension of even an intelligent
and educated people. But the doctrine of uses has still another
significance. The law of real property being founded on reasons
mainly historical, surely its structure will be contemplated with
more interest and its working more thoroughly understood and
mastered by that intelligent practitioner who has accustomed himself to the comparison of past with actual and possible emergencies,
and reflecting that nihil simul inventum est et perfectum, goes over
all the familiar learning on the subject and traces institutions and
laws to their origin to gain correct interpretation. Beyond the
curious learning and speculative interest connected with this topic,
viewing it as a system which has proven itself the parent of our
present method of alienation and an important and all pervading
element of our laws of conveyance, it cannot be that under any circumstances a considerate study of its theory and operation will be
wholly useless or void of instruction.
_
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DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United Statesfor Ohio District.
EX PARTE SIFFORD, MARSHAL ET AL.
1. A return to a writ of habeas corpus issued by a judge of the United States, under
the judiciary act o 1789, showing an imprisonment under process, legal and valid
on its face, is conclusive, and precludes further inquiry into the cause of imprisonmont.
2. rat the seventh section of the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1833, expressly
corfers on a judge of the United States, the power to issue the writ of habeat
r us, in all cases of imprisonment by any authority of law, for any act done or
cr..: 'ted, in obedience to a law of the United States; and where such imprisonment
i: f 1 in alleged violation of a State law, and by State authority, the judge or
c, - " issuing the habeas corpus may inquire into the circumstances under which
thl '..eged crime was committed, with a view to the question whether the act com. i of was done or omitted in the proper discharge of official duty, and under
I . 1hority of the United States: and, if it appears the act was so done or
r ,
the judge 'or court is authorized to discharge the party from such
2ment.
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3. A marshal having a person in custody under lawful process, is bound to retain
Buch custody, and in so doing may use such force as is necessary; and in the
proper use of such force, is not guilty of a crime against the law of the State in
which the transaction occurred.
4. A State judge has no jurisdiction to issue a habeas corpus for a prisoner in the
lawful custody of an officer of the United States, with the knowledge that he is
so held; and if, on the return of the writ, it appears the imprisoned party is held
by an officer of the United States under legal process, the jurisdiction of the State
judge ceases, and all further proceedings by him will be coram nonjudice.
5. A sherif, or other State officer, having a so-called writ of habeas co7pus, under
the-Ohio statute of 1856, and having knowledge that the prisoner named in the
writ is in the custody of an officer of the United States, under legal process, is
under no obligation to serve, or attempt to serve, such writ; and his return of
the facts is a sufficient justification for not serving it.
6. A marshal, having custody of a prisoner under the authority of the United
States, is not bound to surrender such prisoner upon the demand of a State officer,
having a writ issued under the said Ohio statute, requiring him to take the prisoner
from such custody.
7. But if the habeas corpus in the hands of the State officer is issued in good faith,
and is the well known writ of that name, requiring the officer of the United States
having the custody to bring the prisoner before the judge or court issuing the
writ, with the cause of the caption and detention, it is the duty of such officer to
obey such writ, as thereby he does not part with the custody of the prisoner; and
such obedience will not be in conflict with his duty.
8. It is well settled by the adjudications, both of the courts of the Union and the
States, that, in case of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal or court to which
jurisdiction first attaches shall retain it; and neither has a right to interfere with
the other.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEAVITT,

J.-There is no cause to regret the indulgence which

has been extended to counsel, in the presentation and discussion of
this case, or the time, which, for reasons not necessary to be stated,
has elapsed since the hearing commenced. In some aspects, the questions arising are important, and require great deliberation in their
decision. Every case of conflict between the national and State
aiqthorities casts upon the -judge or court called to pass upon it a
most responsible duty; and such cases are the more embarrassing
and difficult when the jurisdiction of the judge or court is challenged,
and a decision of that question becomes necessary. It has been my
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aim to consider with calmness the case before me, and to reach such
conclusions as my judgment will approve. If I have succeeded in
this, the criticisms of those differing from me in my views will, I
trust, have no disturbing influence.
On the 27th of May last, Lewis W. Sifford, the marshal of the
United States for the Southern District of Ohio, presented his petition, duly sworn to, for a writ of 7habeas corpus, alleging, among
other things, that Benjamin P. Churchill and nine others, being
deputy and assistant marshals, were unlawfully imprisoned in the
jail of Clark county, by a process issued by a justice of the peace
of said county, for acts done, or omitted to be done by them, as
such deputies and assistants, in the proper discharge of their duties
under a law, and by the authority of the United States. A writ of
htabeas corpus was issued, according to the prayer of the petition,
directed to John E. Dayton, sheriff of said Clark county, requiring
him to have the said Churchill and others, forthwith, before this
court, with the cause of their caption and detention. The sheriff
has promptly obeyed the writ, and hag made a special return, stating
the circumstances under which the deputies and assistants were
delivered into his custody. The important questions arising in the
case are presented on a motion for the discharge of these persons.
The facts n3cessary to be noticed, preliminary to the consideration
of the points presented, are, that on the 23d of May last, separate
warrants were isssed by Edward R. Newhall, a commissioner
of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the arrest of Hiram
Gutridge t.nd three other persons, residents of Champaign county,
on charges of having aided and abetted a fugitive slave in his escape,
and lving resisted and obstructed the officers of the United States
in the arrcst of such fugitive. The persons named in the warrants
were arrested by the deputy marshals and assistants; and when
conveying them to Cincinnati, where the warrants were returnable,
an attempt was made by the sheriff of Clark county to take said
prisoners from the custody of the officers by a habeas corpus issued
by the probate judge of Champaign county. The sheriff, in his
return to the hzabeas corpus issued to him from this court, alleges
that the writ iesued by the probate judge 'was put into his hands for
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execution by the sheriff of Champaign county, and that, in company
with one Compton as an assistant, he attempted to serve it, by
taking possession of the four prisoners in the custody of the deputy
marshals and their assistants; and that in this attempt he was violently resisted and assaulted, and failed to execute the writ according to its command. It appears that, on a complaint made before
one Huston, a justice of the peace of Clark county, that the deputies
and their assistants had unlawfully assaulted and beat the said
sheriff, they were subsequently seized by a large armed force and
taken before the said justice, and by him committed to the jail of
Clark county; and while so in custody, a new complaint was made
against them for an assault on the sheriff with intent to kill, and
for shooting at said Compton with intent to kill, &c., before one
Christie, a justice of the peace for said county, on which they were
again arrested and committed to jail.
It may be noticed here that, after the seizure of the deputy marshals by the armed force, as aboved stated, and the consequent
rescue of the prisoners from their possession, they were taken by
the sheriff of Greene county before the probate judge of Champaign,
by virtue of the habeas corpus issued by him and were summarily
discharged by his order, and have since been at large.
In considering the question before me, I shall not attempt to
review the extended and able arguments of the counsel, or notice
all the points raised in the discussion. It has been insisted very
strenuously that this court cannot order the discharge of-the deputy
marshals, on the ground that, at the time the writ of habeas corpus
was served, the iinprisonment alleged as existing when the writ
issued had ceased, and they were then in custody on process afterwards issued. I do not propose to consider this point further than
to remark that, from the return of the sheriff of Clark county, it
would seem at least doubtful whether, at the time of the service of
the habeas corpus, the deputies were in custody under the first or
the second warrant. There seems to have been a continuous custody
under these warrants; and it would be somewhat technical, in such
a case as this, to base an order for remanding the deputies on the
ground stated.
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It is also urged-and this is the main point of the argument of
the counsel resisting the discharge of the persons in custody-that,
as it appears from the return to the habeas corpus, they are in the
custody under process issued by a justice of the peace, regular and
lawful on its face, this court has no jurisdiction to go behind that
process, and inquire for what cause and under what circumstances
it issued.
It is admitted that, in reference to the writ of habeas corpus
issued by the courts and judges of the United States, under the
judiciary act of 1789, the position assumed is undoubtedly correct.
The return of the officers showing a detention under process, legal
and valid on its face, would be conclusive and preclude the court or
judge from further inquiry under that act. But the habeas corpus
now in question, was issued under the second section of the act of
the 2d of .Mf
arch, 1833, which provides, "That either of the justices
of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court, in addition
to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners in jail
or confinement, when he or they shall be committed or cofinned on
or by any authority of law for any act done, or omitted to be done,
in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process
or dderee of any judge or court thereof-anything in any act of
Congress to the contrary notwithstanding."
The words of this provision are so explicit and intelligible, that
there would seem to be no room for doubt as to their meaning.
They do confer'and were intended to confer, on a federal judge, the
power to issue the writ of habeas corpus whenever there is an imprisonment "by any authority of law for any act done or committed under
a law of the United States." Now, the point to be inquired into
and determined by the judge issuing the habeas corpus is, whether
the act for which the party is imprisoned has been done in the discharge of official duty, under the authority contemplated by the
provision referred to. But if the return to the writ, showing an
imprisonment, under State process, shuts out all further inquiry,
"the act of Congress is a dead letter and its purpose altogether
defeated.
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The occasion of the passage of the act of Congress of 1833 has
been referred to; and, it is contended in argument, that it must be
limited in its operation to a state of things similar to that then existing; and was intended only to, guard against nullification, when it
appeared in the form of resistance by State authority, to the revenue
laws of the United States. It was doubtless such threatened resistance that called the law into being. But, it has-been permitted to
remain 6n the statute book, in full force for upward of twenty-five
years. This has not been the result of accident or inadvertence.
It was obvious to the members of Congress, and the statesmen, who
have, since the enactment of the law, participated in the affairs of
the country, that it was a wise provision and necessary to meet any
subsequent case of improper interference by a State with the legislation of Congress, in matters pertaining to the national government,
and within the range of its exclusive powers.
There is high judicial authority for the exercise of the power in
question by a judge of the United States, under the act of 1833
in the case, ex parte Bobinson, 6 McLean, 855, known as the
Rosetta case. The facts stated are, that a female slave, traveling in
company with her master, in the State of Ohio, was taken by a
writ of habeas corpus before a probate judge, at Columbus, and
adjudged by him to be free. She was afterwards arrested by the
marshal, as a fugitive, upon a warrant issued by a commissioner;
and upon a 7habeas corpus, issued by Judge Parker of the Court of
Common Pleas of Hamilton county, the alleged fugitive was discharged from the custody of the marshal. She was again arrested
upon another warrant issued by the same commissioner, and, while
in custody, and before the examination by the commissioner, Judge
Parker. adjudged the marshal guilty of a contempt for re-arresting
the female; and he was committed to jail under that judginent.
Judge McLean, on the petition of the marhal, issued a writ of habeas
corpus, returnable before him; and after full argument on the facts
stated, ordered the marshal to be discharged from imprisonment.
The learned judge did not hesitate to issue the habeas corpus, under
.the statute of 1833, and admitted evidence of the facts relating to
the imprisonment of the marshal, and discharged him on the ground
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that he was imprisoned for an act omitted to be done in obedience
to law. Although in that case there had been a judgment by a
court of record, that the alleged fugitive was entitled to her discharge, this was not held to be conclusive; and the judge asserted
the right of going behind the judgment and examining the whole
proceeding. The result was, that the imprisonment of the marshal
was declared to be illegal, and for an act omitted, pursuant to the
law of the United States. In his opinion, the judge says: "A
sense of duty compels me to say that the proceedings of the honorable Judge Parker were not only without authority of law, but against
law, and that the proceedings are void, and I am bound to treat
them as a nullity."
Another case, cited in argument, exparte Jenkins, 2 Wallace, Jr.,
521, asserts the power of a federal judge to issue the writ of habe
corpus in all cases within the language of the act of 1833, and to
discharge, under all circumstances, where the imprisonment is for
an act done by authority of the United States. The learned Judge
Grier, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his opinion
in that case, says: "The authority conferred on the judges of the
United States, by this acf of Congress, gives them all the powers
which any other court could exercise, or gives them none at all. If
under 'such a writ they may not discharge their officer, when imprisoned by any authority, for an act done in pursuance of a law
of the United States, it would be impossible to discover for what
useful purpose the act was passed. Is the prisoner to be brought
before them only that they may acknowledge their utter impotence
to protect him ?"

The case last referred to is very similar, in several of its aspects,
to the one before this court. In that case several deputy marshals
were resisted in their attempts to arrest a fugitive. A complaint
was made before a justice of the peace,- charging the deputies with
an assault and battery on the fugitive; a warrant was issued by
the justice and the deputies were lodged in jail. They applied for
a writ of habeas corpus; and although it appeared on the hearing
they had been committed on process, legal and right on its face,
Judge Grier received evidence that the deputies were imprisoned
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for an act done in the discharge of their duty, and without hesitancy
delivered them from the custody of the jailer.
These cases establish beyond doubt, that a federal judge, or court,
upon the return of a htabeas corpus issued pursuant to the act of
1833, setting up an imprisonment under State process, regular on
its face, may receive evidence as to the facts connected with such
imprisonment; and, if it appears to have been for an act done or
omitted in the performance of official duty, to order the discharge
of the party. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of this
construction. It does not imply any invasion of the sovereignty of
the State, whose process is thus treated. Nor is it based on any
assumption or claim that a federal court or judge has any jurisdiction to revise or set aside, the judgments of the courts or magistrates of the State. It is merely the exercise of power to inquire
into the cause of imprisonment; and if such cause is within the
contemplation of the act, to grant an order for the discharge of the
imprisoned party. Neither does it import, as suggested in the
argument, that a federal judge or court can protect an officer of the
United States from punishment for a crime committed against the
laws of the State, under pretence that he was doing his duty.
. If the jurisdiction, to the extent indicated, does not exist, it is
very clear the sovereignty of the United States is liable every day
to be contemned and trampled upon. Upon any other view, it is
entirely in the power of any one, corrupt enough to make a false
oath against an officer of the United States, having charge of
offenders against its laws, to procure their release, and most effectually to obstruct and nullify the legislation of the Union for the
punishment of crime. It is easy to conceive, how not only the
fugitive-slave law, but the laws for the protection of the post-office
department, and laws, punishing the making of spurious coins of
the United States, may be'defeated in their salutary operations, if
the jurisdiction referred to does not exist.
It is now proper to inquire, whether from the facts before the
court, it sufficiently appears the deputy marshals were in the
rightful and proper discharge of their duties, when the act charged
upon them as a crime against the State of Ohio was committed. I
shall endeavor to do this as briefly as possible.
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In the first place it may be remarked, that these deputies were
in the possession of lawful process for the arrest of parties charged
with a violation of the laws of the United States. And it may be
also noticed, that it was not optional with them whether they would
serve the process. They were under the obligation of an oath, not
only to support the Constitution of the United States, but faithfully
and promptly to serve all legal process which should come into
their hands for service, and were subject to punishment for not
doing so. There is no question, from the evidence, that the warrants referred to, were legally served, and that the prisoners were
legally in the custody of the deputy marshals.
Having the prisoners thus in lawful custody, they had an
undoubted right to use all the force necessary to retain them in
such custody. 'And in case of an open, undisguised attempt to
rescue them by force, they would be justified in killing the assailants, if that were necessary to retain the possession of their prisoner;
and such killing clearly would not be a crime against the State of
Ohio.
But it is insisted that the sheriff of Clark county was in possession of a valid and legal writ of habeas corpus, which he was
attempting in good faith to serve, and that he was violently and
illegally resisted by the deputy marshals in such attempt. On the
other hand, it is urged that the habeas corpus placed in the hands
of sheriff Layton was merely colorable, issued in fraud of the law,
and was a part of a conspiracy by which to effect the rescue of the
prisoners. This writ has been the subject of much comment by
counsel; and authorities have been cited to show that it was a
nullity, and that the sheriff was under no obligation to serve it. As
a consequence, it is insisted, the deputy marshals were not bound to
respect it, and could incur no liability for resisting its execution.
I cannot take the time necessary to discuss or decide all the
points made in the argument in reference to this writ. The transcript of the proceedings by the judge of probate of Champaign
county, who issued the writ and to whom it was returnable, and by
whose order the prisoners were discharged, is before me. The writ
was obtained upon the application of one F. W. Greedhough, who,
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against the truth of the case, took upon himself the responsibility
of swearing that the prisoners were detained in custody, by
Churchill, without legal authority. It was issued under the Ohio
act of 1856, and is directed, not to the person having the prisoners
in charge, but to any and all the sheriffs of the State of Ohio, without any showing, "by affidavit or otherwise," that the officer or
person having the prisoners in custody will refuse or neglect to
obey the writ. This obvious disregard of the provisions of the
statute, I suppose, invalidates the writ, and a sheriff would have
incurred no liability by a refusal to serve it. But I do not propose
to discuss this question, nor to comment on the strange and anomalous provisions of the statute referred to. It will suffice to say that
while it provides for a writ, designated as a writ of habeas corpus,
the writ has really none of the qualities or characteristics of that
great writ of right. Whatever may have been the design of the
statute, it seems admirably suited to effect the rescue of any prisoner
in the custody of an officer of the United States. All that is needed
for this purpose, i an affidavit that such prisoner is illegally
detained in custody, and by the aid of this statute it would-be practicable upon the oath of an unscrupulous affiant, to effect the discharge of a prisoner in the penitentiary, under sentence of any court
of the United States.
But it is further objected to the writ issued by the probate judge,
that he had no jurisdiction, and that the writ is therefore a nullity.
A great number of cases have been referred to in the argument in
support of this position'. Without a critical notice of these cases,
it may be sufficient to remark, that the doctrine seems now to be
settled that a State judge has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus for a prisoner in custody of an officer of the United
States, if the fact of such custody is known to him before issuing
the writ. And it is well settled that if, upon the return of the writ,
it appears the prisoner is in custody under the authority of the
United States, the jurisdic*tion of the State judge is at an end, and
all [further proceedings by him are void. In the case of Sims,
reported in 7 Cushing's Rep. 285, the Supreme Court of Massabefore a writ of habeas corpus
chusetts decided, that in all cases '"
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is granted, sufficient probable cause must be shown; but when it
appears upon the party's own showing that there is no sufficient
ground prima facia for his discharge, the court will not issue the
writ;" and again the court say: "It is not granted. as a matter of
course, and the court will not grant the writ of habeascorpus, when
they see that in the result they must remand the party." In the
case of Norris vs. Newton and ot iers, 5 McLean, 92, Judge

McLean says: "I have no hesitation in saying that the judicial
officers of a State, under its own laws, in a case where an unlawful
imprisonment is shown by one or more affidavits, may issue a writ
of habeas corpus, and inquire into the cause of detention." The
learned judge, it will be noticed, has reference to an imprisonment
under the authority of the United States, and decides, as the condition on which a State judge may issue a writ of habeas corpus, that
it shall first be shown, by affidavits or otherwise, that such imprisonment is unlawful. And he holds, that when it is known to the
judge that the imprisonment is under a law of the United States, his
jurisdiction ceases, and all further proceedings in the case will be
coram non judice.

It does not appear from the transcript of the proceedings before
the probate judge of Champaign county, that the prisoners were in
custody under process of the United States; but it is hardly supposable that the fact was not known to that judge. But as this is
not shown in the transcript, it cannot be assumed as a fact. A
strong light is, however, cast upon this transaction by the proof
before the court, *thatwhen the prisoners were brought before the
probate judge, and when it was his duty to inquire into and ascertain the precise ground on which they were held in custody by the
deputy marshals, he ordered them to be summarily discharged.
The reason of this order, as appears from the transcript, was, that
no one appeared to show by what authority the prisoners were
arrested and held in custody. The truth was-whether known to
the probate judge does not appear-that the deputy marshal named
in the proceedings, and who was so solemnly called and defaulted
for his non-appearance, was, at the time, a close prisoner in the jail
of the adjoining county of Clark !
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It is also insisted, in argument, that if the deputies had the lawful
custody of these prisoners, and were justified in resisting any attempt
to take them by a State officer, that such resistance was excessive,
and that, by such excess, they have forfeited the protection intended
by the act of 1833, and are amenable to the law of Ohio. As before
noticed, the only question with which I am now to deal is, whether
the act charged as criminal against the deputies was done in the
proper discharge of their official duties. This inquiry necessarily
leads to a notice of some of the facts before the court, in connection
with the attempted rescue of the prisoners. Many of the statements in the affidavits have no reference to this transaction, and
need not be specially noticed. It is the alleged violence of the
deputies in resisting the sheriff, that forms the basis of the complaint against them before the justice of the peace of Clark cointy.
If in this they have done no more than their official duty justified
them in doing, they are within the protection of the act of
Congress.
In stating my vieivs on this point of the case, I shall not attempt
a critical examination of the statements of the witnesses on either
side. In some important particulars there are discrepancies and
contradictions in the facts set forth in the numerous affidavits which
have been read. I shall make no effort to reconcile these; nor is it
necessary that I should indicate an opinion as to the credit due to
the conflicting statements.
There are some considerations which are conclusive of the question indicated. In his oral evidence, if not in his affidavit, sheriff
Layton admits he was notified when the writ of habeas corpus was
placed in his hands, that the persons having the custody of the
prisoners were deputy marshals, and held the prisoners under the
authority of the United States. It is very clear, upon the authorities before referred to, that, with a knowledge of this fact, even if
the writ were valid, the power of the sheriff was at an end, and he
was wrong in attempting the service. As an officer sworn to support the Constitution of the 'United States, he was under no obligation to serve it, and would have incurred no liability in refusing to
do so. His return of the fact that the prisoners were held by the
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paramount authority of the United States, would have been a complete justification for not serving the writ. He was fully aware
that the writ could not be served without bringing the authorities
of the United States and the State of Ohio into-direct collision, and
that the issue to be settled was purely one of physical power. If
unnecessarily, and against the obligations of official duty, he placed
himself iaa position of peril, he may be supposed to have done so
with a full knowledge of what the consequences might be, and a
determination to meet them at all hazards.
To understand the nature of this conflict, it should be remembered
that the deputy marshals, by their official oaths, were under a positive and paramount obligation to retain their prisoners, and to
oppose all attempts to rescue them. The prisoners were lawfully
in their custody, and they would have been derelict in duty to have
parted with that custody, unless compelled to do so by an overpowering physical force. The sheriff had a writ which commanded
him to take the prisoners from the custody of these officers of the
United States. It was not the usual and well-known writ of habeas
corpus, summoning the party having the alleged unlawful custody
of the persons named in the writ, to have them before the officer
issuing it, with the cause of their detention, but a writ requiring
them to be taken, forcibly, if necessary, from those having the prior
and lawful custody. This was the only way of serving the writ;
and the question whether it could be served, was simply a question
of power. So the sheriff understood it; and hence he and his
assistants deliberately armed themselves, as a preparation for the
conflict, which they foresaw was inevitable. In serving the writ,
their first object was to do what the writ required-namely, to take
the prisoners from the custody of the deputy marshals. Counting,
probably on the active co-operation of the prisoners, they made this
attempt. It is altogether immaterial whether the sheriff, on coming
up with the United States officers, announced his official character,
or that he had a writ requiring him to take the prisoners. If such
announcement were made-which is doubtful from the weight of the
testimony-it was an idle form, which the deputies were not bound
to respect, and which can have no influence in the decision of this
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question. They would have been faithless to their duty if they had
quietly surrendered their prisoners upon such a notice.
It is apparent, from facts not in controversy, that the sheriff and
his assistant well understood how the writ was to be served. They
were apprised that a mere statement that they were officers of the
State of Ohio, and had a writ of habeas corpus for the prisoners,
would come altogether short of the exigency of the writ. They knew
that nothing but the actual capture of the prisoners and their corporeal custody would answer its demands. Hence, the first movement was the seizing, by the assistant of the sheriff, of the bridle of
the horse in the foremost carriage. He was resisted in this attempt,
and immediately aimed his revolver at the deputy; and, if he did
not actually fire, it is beyond all question he made the attempt.
Whether he fired, or only made the attempt, the officer whose life
was thus put at hazard, had an undoubted right, in self-defence, to
disable his assailant, and was fully justified in firing at him with
this view. It may be noticed here, as throwing some light on the
intention of the sheriff and his assistant, that the sheriff states as his
impression that his assistant, as he drove past the rear carriages,
pointed his pistol from the carriage in which he rode; thus giving
a very significant indication of what might be expected if the prisoners were not peaceably surrendered.
But it is said the sheriff was most wantonly injured in this affray.
In his oral testimony he states that, after leaving his buggy, he
approached the carriage in which Churchill rode, with pistol in hand,
prepared to fire, and intending to fire at Churchill. This fact is
clearly proved by many other witnesses in their affidavits ; and it is
also proved beyond doubt, that it was when the sheriff was thus
approaching Churchill, that the latter seized him, with the sole view
of disarming him, and thus saving his own or the lie of another
person. It is greatly to be regretted that the sheriff was so severely
injured in this rencounter; but if any fact is established in this case,
it is that these injuries resilted from the conflict in the attempt to
disarm him. In such a contest, the degree of force which may be
used cannot be graduated with absolute precision.
If the writ put into the hands of the sheriff had been issued in
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good faith, and were the well-known writ of habeas corpus, requiring the deputy marshals to produce the bodies of the prisoners, for
the purpose of inquiring into the cause of their detention, it would
have been the duty of those officers to take the persons before the
judge. If not as a matter of legal obligation, the courtesy due to
the authorities of another jurisdiction would have required this. In
doing this they would have retained the possession of the prisoners,
as no State judge, it may be presumed, would have authorized their
discharge, when it was made known to him that they were held
under valid United States authority. But, as before noticed, the
writ under the extraordinary Ohio law of 1856, requiring the officer
to whom it is directed to take the prisoners,. no matter by whom
or by what authority they are detained, is a wholly different thing.
This act seems to have been inconsiderately passed, and in its practical execution must lead to frequent conflicts between the national
and State authorities. It might, with great propriety, be designated as an act to prevent the execution of laws of the United States
within the State of Ohio.
It seems clear that the deputy marshals were right, under the
circumstances of this case, in resisting the attempt to rescue the
prisoners from their custody. Judge Nelson, one of the justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, has stated the law on this
point with great force and accuracy. While he concedes that there
may be cases in which a State judge may be justified in granting a
habeas corpus for a prisoner in confinement under United States
*process, he asserts that, if the process is legal, the officer having the
person in charge will not be justified in surrendering that custody
under any circumstances. The learned judge says: "In such case
-that is, where the prisoner is, in fact, held under process issued
by a federal tribunal, under the constitution, or a law of the United
States, or a treaty-it is the duty of an officer not to give him up,
or to allow him to pass from his hands at any stage of the proceedings. He should stand upon his authority; and, if resisted, maintain it with all the power conferred on him for that purpose."
'(1 Blatchford's Rep. 635.) Even in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction in the general government and a State, it is well
43
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settled, both by the adjudications of the federal and State courts,
that the tribunal to which the jurisdiction first attaches shall retain
it. In the case exparte Jenkins, before cited, Judge Grier says :
"Where persons or property are liable to seizure and arrest by the
process of both, that which first attached should have the preference.
Any attempt of either to take from the legal custody of the officers
of the other, would be an unjustifiable exercise of its power, and
lead to most deplorable consequences." Such is the law where there
is an admitted concurrent jurisdiction. With how much greater
force does it apply where the right or power exercised is exclusive
in the United States ?
It cannot be necessary to notice further the legal points arising
in the case, or the numerous facts set forth in the affidavits. The
conclusions indicated seem to be fully sustained by the law and the
facts. There is, however, a general view of the case, that leaves
no doubt as to the real character of the transaction involved. It
cannot be controverted, that there was a settled purpose, in at least
a portion of the community in which these occurrences took place,
to prevent, either by direct or indirect means, the execution of a
law of the United States. Four persons had been arrested, under
legal process, for an alleged violation of one of the provisions of the
fugitive-slave law. There is known to exist, in the counties to
which reference has been made, a decided feeling of hostility to
that act; and the opinion is entertained-it may be honestly by
many-that the law has no validity, and is not entitled to respect
or obedience. Those entertaining these extreme views, seem to
suppose there is not only no wrong, in any attempt to prevent its
execution, but that such attempt is in itself meritorious. With such
views, it is not strange that men chould be prepared for extreme
and indefensible measures to render the law inoperative. It does
not admit of a doubt that practical nullification was the purpose of
those who opposed the officers of the United States in the execution
of their duties on the occasion referred to. Great excitement prevailed, and crowds followed the officers in charge of the prisoners.
From their excited bearing, there were reasons for the apprehension that an undisguised and forcible attempt at a rescue would be
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made. It does not change the real character of the views and purposes of these persons that they deemed it most expedient to effect
their object by a resort to the forms of law.
Much has been said by counsel on the importance of the questions involved in this case. The danger of invading the sovereignty
of the State of Ohio has been exhibited in most eloquent and forcible terms; and the court has been admonished of the fearful
results of the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. It is readily
conceded that a federal judge or court, should tread with cautious
steps upon the line dividing the national and State sovereignties.
But it should be remembered that sovereignty pertains to the
government of the United States as well as to that of the States.
The general government, within its constitutional limits, is supreme,
and its action is paramount to any opposing action on the part of
the States. Every right-thinking and right hearted American
citizen will feel and admit the obligation resting on him to sustain
the just powers of the Union, as well as of the State in which he
resides. A proper fealty to both is due from and demanded of
every citizen; and these obligations are neither repugnant, or
inconsistent. Upon the just recognition of each depends the existence and perpetuity of our government.
Now, the practical question in this case is, whether a law of the
United States can be evaded and .set at naught, either by direct
and violent opposition, which is rebellion, or by the specious pretences of law. And this question is in no degree affected by thecharacter of the law sought to be nullified. I know well there is a.
deep seated hostility to the fugitive-slave act of 1850 throughout
most of the free States. I am also aware that there is among the
people of Ohio an almost unanimous sentiment in opposition toslavery; and that there are few, if any, of her citizens, who desire
its introduction into the State. But these considerations do not
excuse or justify attempts to defeat the national laws, sanctioned
by the Constitution of the United States, growing out of the exist-ence of that institution, in other portions of the Union. There may
'be very strong and well-founded objections to the law referred to,
but, while it is a law, it must be respected and obeyed as such..
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The power called foith in its enactment is one which belongs exclusively to the government of the Union, and with which the States
have no right to interfere. It should be remembered, too, that it
is an emanation of the will of the nation, expressed through the
representatives of the States and the people, according to the forms
of the constitution. Its repeal, by the same power that passed it,
is the only method by which it can cease to have the force of law.
It is unquestionably true, that every citizen has a right to, and
may enjoy and express, without stint or hindrance his opinions
upon any law or measure of public policy; but it does not follow
that he may evade or resist the execution of a law, because he
regards it as.unjust or inexpedient. If one man is to be tolerated
in such evasion or resistance, in regard to one law, others may do
the same as to other laws. The result would be, that every man,
being a law unto himself, and acting under some vague notion of a
higher law, would choose for himself what laws he would obey.
This would produce a state of unmitigated anarchy, and effectually
undermine the foundations of the social fabric. It is wholly beyond the limits of man's mental power to estimate the deplorable
results of the prevalence of such a doctrine. As an unavoidable
sequence, the bands of that union, which has been so potent for
good to our country, so instrumental in its rapid advance to prosperity and greatness, would be dissolved. In this event, a future
would be presented which none could contemplate without the
deepest horror. I trust no such calamity is in store for this nation.
It is matter of devout thankfulness that the safety of the Union is
not placed in the keeping of politicians, or extremists of any school
or any section of the country. In the underlying depths of public
opinion, whatever may be the agitations on its surface, there is an
overmastering power which, if the emergency shall arise, will come
forth as a strong man armed in defence of the common bond of
national brotherhood and national existence.
The deputy marshals axe discharged.

Stanleyi Matthews, George -. Pugh, C. L. Vallandingkam, for
petitioners.

R. Mason and C. P. Wolcott, contra.

FLETCHER vs. PHELPS.

In the Supreme Court of Vermont.
JUDSON B. FLETCHER vs. SAMUEL PHELPS AND BENAJAH PHELPS."

Lands bounded on Lake Champlain extend to the edge of the water at low water
mark. The same rule applied, in this case; to lands near the lake bbunded on a
creek emptying into, and the waters of which ordinarily maintain the same level,

and rise and fall with those of the lake; there being no claim made that the
boundary should extend to the centre of the creek.

Assumpsit, founded upon a written agreement of the defendants
to pay the plaintiff twenty-two dollars for each acre of a farm of
land in South Hero, deeded by the plaintiff to Samuel Phelps and
George Phelps. Plea, the general issue; trial by jury, August
Term, 1854,-Peck, J., presiding.
The land deeded to Samuel and George Phelps -was described in
the plaintiff's deed as the south part of lot No. 88, bounded north
by Abner Keeler's land, east by the lake and the creek, south by
lands of Gairdner Tracy, and west by lot No. 89. The only
question in dispute was in reference to the eastern boundary of
this lot, the plaintiff claiming it to be a line indicated, on a plan of
the premises, as the Fletcher survey; and the defendants claiming
it to be a line further west, indicated on the plan as the Phelps
survey ;-between these two lines it was admitted that there was a
space of five acres and one hundred and fifty-two rods of land ;
the line claimed by the defendants being near the eastern border
of the hard land, corresponding with the line of bushes hereafter
mentioned ;-and the line claimed by the plaintiff being near the
western bank of the channel hereafter mentioned, which he claimed
as the creek proper ;-no part of said channel being included in
the five acres and one hundred and fifty-two rods. The plaintiff's
testimony tended to show that there was a creek which connected
with the lake near the north side of the land in question, and extended southwardly about two miles ; and that, opposite the premises
in question, it was about sixty to seventy rods wide in high water,
gradually growing narrower as you proceeded south; that in the
We are indebted to the learned State Reporter for this case.
ported in 2 Williams' Rep.-Ed&. A. L. R.

It will be

re-
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middle of the summer there was but very little water in the creek,
and that confined to the channel near the centre ; that in the centre
there was a channel from one to two rods wide, varying in width in
different places, and somewhat crooked ; that this channel was a
little lower than the surfiace of the land on each side; that no
vegetation grew in the channel, and that the Ave or six acres in dispute lay between the hard land west, which was skirted by a line of
bushes or small trees and this channel, and that it lay low, nearly
on a level with the lake, and was covered with water, from the lake,
every spring, till some time in June ; that from 1810 to 1816 it was
a quagmire, and of no value and capable of no use or occupancy;
and that it was not used for any purpose until 1816, when some
wild oats and other vegetables began to grow there, and that it had
been gradually filling up and improving ever since; that the occupants of the hard land on the west had occupied this low tract in
question in connection with the hard land, whenever the low land
was succeptible of occupation.
The defendant offered to show that, by the original allotment of
the town, the lots were sixty-four acre lots ; that the lot in question
measured down to the east border of the hard land seventy acres;
that the land in dispute was navigable for vessels, every year, by
water setting up from the lake ; and that it was covered with muskrat houses; and that after the water in the lake fell, and about
mid-summer, cattle strayed on the land in question,-but that no
vegetation grew on it, except such as was about worthless and was
not used except in years of great scarcity of hay, and in such case
a great portion and most of the fodder cut on it was flags and bullrushes; that the land itself rose and fell more or less with the rise
and fall of the water of the lake ; that the surface of the land in
the lowest water was never a foot above the surface of the water in
the lake ; that the land was susceptible of no -cultivation, and that
teams never had been and never could be driven upon it; that this
whole strip of land had always been known and called "the creek"
by people of the vicinity; that there were no distinct banks to the
.4hannel of the creek, but that what the witnesses on the part of
the plaintiff called the channel was a narrow strip in the middle of
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this low creek land, in which no vegetation whateier grew; that it
was slightly depressed in the centre and gradually rose to the edge
of the low tract in question, where vegetation, such as described,
grew, and1 from that point to within one or two rods of the hard
land it was entirely level, and that from there, for a rod or two, it
gradually and slightly ascended to the hard land; that the creek
and creek land extended in length about one and a half or two
miles south of the land in question, gradually growing narrower at
the south end, and connecting with the lake only at the north end;
that the rise and fall of the water in the creek was caused by the
rise and fall of the water in the lake; and that the water in the
creek came wholly from the lake, except the surface water from the
adjoining land in time of rains, and some small springs upon and
above the land in question, which were drained off in the dry portion of the season through the channel of the creek.
The defendant offered to show in what manner the continuation
of this strip of land had been regarded and treated by the owners
of the adjoining lands in their occupancy of it, and by reference to
their conveyances of the adjoining lands, and the records of division of it, and what conversation was had by the plaintiff both at
the time of, and subsequent to the making of the contract and conveyande in question.
There was no evidence offered, nor was it claimed by the defendants, that the land in dispute was ever set to any other lot than the
one bounding it on the west,-or that it was ever occupied or
claimed by any one else than the occupants of the lot deeded; but
the defendants did claim that it was not set in the allotment of the
town, (which was many years ago,) to said lot. It appeared that
there was, in the allotment of the town a tier of lots on the west
side of the creek, but no plan or survey of the town was introduced
to show whether the lots bounding the creek run to the channel of
the creek or not.
. The evidence offered by the defendants was objected to by the
plaintiff, and the court excluded it, as having no tendency to show
'that the tract in dispute ought to be excluded in the estimate of the
price of the land; to this the defendants excepted, and thereupon
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submitted to a verdict under the direction of the court to the jury
to include the land in dispute in estimating the aggregate price of
the land- to be paid for under the contract.
G. Harringtonfor the defendants.

K. B. Beardsley for the plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered, at the circuit session in
September, by
IsHrAM, J.-The question in this case is one of boundary. The
matter in dispute is determined by ascertaining the eastern line of
the lot which was conveyed by the plaintiff to George and Samuel
Phelps, by his deed of May 4, 1850. The question becomes important in order to determine the number of acres embraced in the
deed, for which the defendants are to pay the plaintiff, per acre, the
price stipulated in their contract. The lot is described in the deed
as being bo'unded on the "lake and the creek." The plaintiff insists that the creek is limited to the crooked line, or the Fletcher
survey, as marked on the plan, and that all the land west of that
line should be measured to ascertain the number of acres contained
in the deed. The defendants, on the other hand, insist that no
land was conveyed by the deed any further east than the dotted
line on the Phelps survey, as indicated on the plan, which runs on the
border of what is termed the hard land, thus excluding the low land
lying east of that line. The land thus excluded appears to be low
land lying but little above the surface of the lake, and consequently
is so much inundated in times of high water that it is rendered of
no use for cultivation, and of no great value for pasturage or meadow. The quantity of land in dispute is five acres and one hundred and fifty-two rods, for which the plaintiff seeks to recover the
price stipulated to be paid per acre for the whole farm. The court
excluded the evidence offered by the defendants, and directed the
jury to include the land in dispute in estimating the aggregate price
of the land under the contract; thus establishing the eastern
boundary of the lot as beinig on the Fletcher survey, but not so as
to embrace any part of the channel of the creek. We are satisfied
that the defendants have no reason to complain of that direction of
the court to the jury.
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As a general rule, if the description of the land in a deed is
ambiguous or doubtful, or if the lines and monuments referred to
are lost or destroyed, parol evidence of the practical construction
given by the.parties, by acts of occupancy, recognition of monuments or boundaries, is admissible for the purpose of identifying
the land, and in aid of the interpretation of the deed. Stone vs.
Clark, 1 Met. 378 ; Waterman vs. Johnson,18 Pick. 261; 1 Greenl.
Ev. § 301, note. But where no ambiguity exists, and the parties, in
describing the land, have used terms and language in the deed, referring to known, existing and permanent monuments, it is the duty
of the court to give to the description and the language of the parties a legal construction; and parol evidence is no more admissible
to control its legal effect than it is of any other stipulation of the
parties contained in the deed. It is for the court, in such cases, to
decide what is embraced in the deed, and to definitely determine
its lines and boundaries, Where land is sold and bounded on a
river or stream of water above tide-water, the grant extends to the
middle of the'channel or thread of the stream. This is the legal
effect of the conveyance, and it cannot be varied or controlled by
parol testimony. Tyler vs. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 897; Claremont
vs. Carleton, 2 N. H. 869; .Hooper vs. Cumings, 20 Johns. 91;
Angell on Water Courses, § 11-12, and notes. The same principle
applies where land is bounded upon an artificial pond, as a mill-pond
and the like. State vs. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461 ; ffathorn vs.
Stinson, 1 Fairf. 238. But a different rule prevails where land is
conveyed bounded on large natural ponds or lakes; in such case,
the grant extends to the water's edge, or if, as observed by Ch. J.
Shaw, in Waterman vs. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261, the lake or pond
have a definite low water line, the grant will extend to low water
mark. Canal Commissioners vs. People, 5 Wend. 423; State vs.
Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 491. Such is the legal effect which is given to
conveyances of that character.
In relation to the premises in question, so far as they are bounded
on the lake, no difficulties have arisen between these parties. The
-line extends to the edge of the water at low water mark. The
same rule, we think, should be applied to land bounded on this creek.
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In times of high water on the lake, this creek appears to be but
little more than an arm or inlet of the lake itself, as the rise and
fall of the water in the creek depends upon the rise and fall of the
water in the lake. There is a small rivulet or stream which passes
through the centre of this low land to the lake, when it is not overflowed, the bed of which is distinguished by being somewhat lower than
the rest of the low land. At low water on the lake, the stream is
limited to this channel, and is, to some extent, supplied with water
from inland springs. Whether the measurement of the farm should
have been extended to the centr of that stream or not, is not the
question before us, as the court limited the line to the bank of the
stream, and that all west of that line should be included in the
measurement in ascertaining the number of acres in the farm; we
have no doubt, as it was land.conveyed by the deed, the title to
which passed to the grantees, and for which, if the plaintiff had
withheld the possession, the defendants could have sustained the
action of ejeetment. That part of the evidence which was offered
by the defendants in relation to the character and quality of the
land in dispute, was, therefore, properly rejected.
The same principle will exclude the evidence offered in relation to
the original allotment of the land, the sale of contiguous land and
its occupancy by others, the records of division, and the conversation of the parties at the time of conveyance, &c. The lake
and the creek mentioned in the deed are existing and natural monuments, and when called for by the deed, control quantity, lines,
courses and distances ;-as monuments of that character afford the
highest and best evidence of the intention of the parties. Howe vs.
Bass, 2 Mass. 380; TFendall vs. Jackson, 8 Wend. 190; Butler
vs. Widger, 7 Cowen, 723 ; Bich vs. Bich, 16 Wend. 663; 3 Phil.

Evid. by Cowen & Hill 1379; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 301, note. Those
monuments, therefore, must control the legal effect of this grant;
and parol evidence is inadmissible to establish other boundaries, as
there is no ambiguity in the deed, nor any uncertainty as to the
monuments referred to. We see no error in the ruling of the
county court on this subject.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.

CAMPBELL vs. CABEEN.

In the District Court of Philadelphia.
CHARLES 33. CAMP1BELL ET AL. Vs. ROBERT B. CABEEN ET AL., GARNISHEES.

1. It is the settled rule in the law of stoppage in transitu that movable property
sold but not paid for, may, on the discovery of the-vendee's insolvency before it
has come into his possession, be seized by the vendor.
2. Where A., shipped blooms to Philadelphia, consigning them to B & Co. with writ-

ten instructions to deliver them "to the order of C," and they were so received
and 85 pieces forwarded to C, who subsequently became insolvent, the right of
stoppage in transitu in A., is gone, inasmuch as the transit was completely at an
end when the blooms reached B & Co., who held them subject to C's orders and

as his agents; and D., may issue foreign attachment and seize the blooms as C's
property.

The following cases were stated for the opinion of the court:
On the seventh or eighth of January, 1855, said garnishees received a letter from H. B. Seidel relative to a quantity of blooms,
which he had previously sold to Louis Ohevrier, as follows:
Monroe Forge, Jan. 6, 1855.
Messrs. OABEEN & CO. :
GENTLEMEN :-I
have to-day sent to the Pine Grove depot 28,079
pounds blooms, in 841 pieces, consigned to you, which please deliver to the order of Mr. L. Chevrier, Trenton.
Very respectfully,
(Signed,)
H. B. SEIDEL.
Said blooms arrived in Philadelphia on the 9th of January, 1855,
and were received by garnishees, who immediately sent 85 pieces to
Mr. Chevrier, at Trenton, and soon afterwards received from him
a letter, as follows, to wit:
Trenton, Jan. 9, 1855.
& Co., Philadelphia:
GENTLEMEN :-I
have a letter of Mr. H. B. Seidel, informing
me that he has sent me 841 blooms to your care. Please don't send
them by railroad. I think very shortly we will have a boat running. First time I shall go to Philadelphia, I -will call on you.
Yours, most respectfully,
(Signed)
L. OHEYRIER.

Messrs.

ABEEN
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To which the garnishees replied:
"
Phladephia,Jan. 9, 1855.
OimvRIER, ESQ.:

DEAR SiR :-We enclose railway receipts for 85 pieces blooms,
(Seidel's,) which had been sent when yours of this date came to
hand. The remainder will be held subject to your order.
Yours,
CABEEN & 00.

Mr. Chevrier wrote again on the 24th of January, 1855, as
follows:
Trenton, Jan. 24, 1855.
Messrs. CABEEN & Co., Philadelphia:
GENTLEMENT:-I believe there is a boat loading for Trenton,
(Chestnut street wharf.) Would you be so kind as to make some
inquiries, and if possible, send me the balance of blooms.
Please send me your bill of expenses, Mr. H. B. Seidel separate.
Yours, most respectfully,
(Signed)
L. CHEYRIER.
And the garnishees replied on the day following, to wit:
Philadelphia,Jan. 25, 1855.
L. CHERRIER, ESQ., Trenton, N. J.:
DEAR SIR :-Yours of 24th instant is at hand. The only Trenton packet now here has a full cargo on board, and the captain says
unless the weather softens he will not attempt to go up. Please
get the captain of the next vessel that comes down to call on us when
he is ready to take in your blooms.
"Yours, respectfully,
CABEEN & C0.
A foreign attachment was issued at the suit of said plaintiff on
the 26th day of January, 1855, to March term 1855, No. 24, against
Louis Chevrier, which on the 26th of January, 1855, was served
upon said garnishees, who immediately notified Mr. Seidel and Mr.
Chevrier of the fact by letter, as follows:

H. B. SEIIDEL, ESQ.:

Hhiladelphid, Jan. 26, 1855.

DEAR SIR :-Eighty-five pieces out of the 341 pieces of blooms
sent to our care for L. Chevrier were sent to him by railroad, when
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an order came from Mr. Chevrier to hold on to the remainder till
the vessels commenced running, and we advised him that we would
hold them subject to his further instructions, and they have remained
in our hands till this time.
This afternoon we have had served on us a writ of foreign attachment, at the suit of Chas. B. Campbell & Co., which please note and
take such steps in the matter as may be best for your interest.
We hope to hear that you have before this received a satisfactory
settlement for the blooms from Mr. Chevrier.
CABEEN & CO.
Yours, truly,
We will be glad to do all we can for your interest in this matter,
if you will let us know what we can do.
Philadelipia,Jan. 26, 1855.
Mr. L. CHEVRIEXR:

SIR :-We have this afternoon had served on us a writ of
attachment, at the suit of Chas. B. Campbell & Co., for the blooms
in our hands received from Mr. Seidel for you, which please note,
and take such action in the matter as may be advisable.
We have notified Mr. Seidel of the above.
CABEEN & CO.
Yours, respectfully,
DEAR

In answer to their letter to Mr. Chevrier, they received the following; to wit:
Trenton, Jan. 27, 1855.
Messrs.

CABEEN & CO.:

GENTLEMEN :-I

have received this morning your favor of yester-

day. I am so vexed at the proceeding of Campbell that I can
hardlywrite. You yourselves know that the blooms in your possession
are the blooms of Mr. Seidel, and his property. I am writing to
Messrs. Campbell. I enclose a copy of my letter to them, and also
Yours, most respectfully,
send a copy to Mr. Seidel.
L. CHEVRIER.
(Signed)
Uopy of letter enclosed.
Trenton, Jan. 27, 1855.

Messrs. C. B. CAMPBELL & CO.:
I have just received a letter of Messrs. Cabeen & Co., informing me that you have made an
GENTLEmE-N :-What have you done?
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attachment on blooms at Messrs. Cabeen & Co.'s, thinking they are
mine. You have ruined me, and done a great injury to yourselves.
The blooms belong to Mr. Seidel. Messrs. Cabeen has written
to him, and I am also writing to him, to take the necessary steps to
prevent your proceeding any further. It is true that I could have
had those blooms, that I had some of them, but as long they are in
Messrs. Cabeen and Co.'s hands they are the property of Mr. Seidel, and he can do with them what he pleases, you or me notwithstanding. I never had a bill of them, nor made a cent advance on
them. You have been in the commission and forwarding business
long enough to know more about it. Will go to Philadelphia on
Yours,
Monday; will call and see you.
L. CHEVRIER.
(Signed)
On the 1st of February, 1855, they received from Mr. Seidel the
following notice:
.Philadelphia,Feb. 1, 1855.
Messrs. CABEEN & CO.:
GENTLEMEN :-I'am informed that Mr. L. Chevrier is in embarrassed circumstances. You will therefore not deliver to his order
the blooms I consigned to you on January 6,1855, or whatever portion of them may yet be in your possession.
Respectfully, yours,
H. B. SEIDEL.
(Signed)
Messrs. Cabeen & Co. are dealers in iron, and general receiving
and storing agents for the iron trade, and keep a general depot for receiving, storing and delivering iron. Said Chevrier was insolvent
when the order to stop the delivery of the blooms was given.
The whole of said blooms, with the exception of the 85 pieces
delivered to the said Louis Chevrier as above mentioned, are still
in their possession. If the court should be of opinion with the
plaintiffs, then judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiffsthat they have execution against the personal-property of said
Louis Chevrier, in the podsession of said garnishees, for the amount
of their judgment in said suit of foreign attachment, first paying to
defendants thirty dollars ($30) due for storage and their reasonable
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expenses in the proceeding; if otherwise, then judgment to be
entered in favor of defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STROUD, J.-This case is to be regarded as between Seidel as

vendor, and Chevrier as vendee. For the plaintiffs are but creditors
of Chevrier, proceeding by foreign attachment, and according to
Hays v. .Monille, 14 P. S. R. 48, occupy no better position than
Chevrier himself. Cabeen & Co. claim no special interest in the
goods. The relation which they hold is that of a mere depository.
The principle of law on which the right of stoppiage in transitu
depends, is very simple, and as well settled as any part of commercial jurisprudence. Movable property sold, but not paid for, may,
on the discovery of the vendee's insolvency before it has come into
his possession, be seized by the vendor. All the decisions agree in
this. The earlier ones require that actual possession should be
*)btained by the vendee to prevent the right of stoppage, and so
restricted, the right was easily ascertained. But what is styled a
constructive possession is now universally admitted as a part of the
law. In determining what in each case is to be deemed a constructive possession, is frequently a question of much difficulty.
Where, as in the present case, the whole evidence is in writing,
the question is to be determined by the court. -Poz v. Clifton, 9
ling. 115; Collis v. Stack, 1 Excheq. Rep. 605, 609.
The case stated, may be regarded as consisting entirely of written evidence. There is no allusion to former transactions between
the parties of any kind, nor indeed does it appear that they had
ever had any. We have a bald transcript of letters; none of which
were between Seidel and Chevrier-the vendor and vendee-but
between each of them and Cabeen & Co., the garnishees.
In what light are Cabeen & Co. to be regarded in respect to the
goods ? If Seidel's directions were that 'theys hould forward them
to Ohevrier, all the cases show that the right of stoppage existed so
long as this relation existed. The transit on this supposition must
have been between Monroe Forge, where Seidel had his iron-works,

CAMPBELL vs. CABEEN.

and the city of Trenton, the residence and place of business of
Chevrier. But does the correspondence show that such was the
meaning of the parties to it?
The transaction dates from the letter of Jan. 6, 1855, from
Seidel to Cabeen & Co. It consists of a few lines, "I have to-day
sent to the Pine Grove depot 28,079 pounds blooms, in 341 pieces,
consigned to you, which please deliver to the order of Mr. L. Chevrier, Trenton."
Did this authorize Cabeen & Co. to forward the goods to Chevrier
without receiving any instructions from him? It plainly did not.
The directions are explicit, " deliver to the order of L. Chevrier,
Trenton." The goods were not to be sent to Trenton, but to that
or any other place which he might desire. Or they might be left)
where they were, should Chevrier so request, and Cabeen & Co.
consent to keep them. This would be, substantially, a delivery to
the order of Chevrier. And this was the understanding of the
parties, evidenced by Chevrier's letter of January 9, and Cabeen &
Co.'s reply on the same day, which concludes, "the remainder (i. e.
of the blooms) will be held subject to your order."
The goods had, by this correspondence, been placed in the very
condition expressed by Lord Ellenborough, in Dixon v. Baldwin,
5 East, 186,-they "had so far gotten to the end of their journey,
that they waited for new orders from the purchaser to put them
again in motion-to communicate to them another substantial destination, and that without such orders they would continue stationary." This, as the court there decided, was the end of the transit.
Chancellor Kent adopts the same test. " The point of inquiry,"
says he, "is whether the property is to be considered as still in its
transit; for if it has once fairly arrived at its destination, so as to
give the vendee the actual exercise of dominion and ownership over
it, the right of stoppage is gone." 2 Kent, 545.
Dixon v. Baldwin, is a leading case on the doctrine of stoppage
in transitu. It has been so regarded everywhere.
In Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436, Baron Parke,
speaking of Dixon v. Baldwin, says, "Lord Ellenborough lays
down the doctrine that the transit is completely at an end when the

CAMPBELL vs. CABEEN.

.

goods arrive at an agent's who is to keep them until he receives
further orders of the vendee."
This is precisely our case, according to the literal and proper
import of Seidel's letter of Jan. 6, 1855, to Cabeen & Co.
I am not aware that the authority of Dixon v. Baldwin has ever
been impugned or doubted.
In England it has been followed in numerous cases. Thus, when
bales of flax, sold by A., in London, to B., residing at Mickley
Mill, were addrpssed to "B., Mickley," and then shipped to Hull
under a bill of lading making them deliverable "at the port of
Boroughbridge for B., Mickley Mill." The bales were forwarded
from lull to Boroughbridge, by water carriage, and deposited there
in the warehouse of C., a party unconnected with the carriers, who
was in the habit of receiving goods for B., and retaining them at
B.'s risk, and without charging warehouse rent, until fetched away
by B., or delivered to other persons by his orders; it was held that
the transit was at an end, and the bales could not be stopped by
A., upon the'insolvency of B., although B. had not exercised any
act of ownership over them." Dodson v. entworth, 4 M. & G.
1080.
Valpy v. Gibson, 4 Common Bench, 837, and Wentworth v.
Outhwaite, 10 M. & W. 436, are strong cases, illustrating and confirming the same doctrine.
In this country, Sawyer v. Joslin, 20 Verm. Rep., 172, in which
the whole subject of stoppage in transitu was examined with much
care, adopts the principle of Dixon v. Baldwin, in its entire extent. Their goods were shipped at Troy, N. Y., directed to the
vendee, at Vergennes, Vermont, and were landed upon the wharf
at Vergennes, iihich was half a mile from the vendee's place of
business. It was the custom in such cases, for the owners of goods
to receive them at the wharf, and transport them to their respective
places of business. No one was charged with the care of the goods
whilst they remained upon the wharf. The transit was held to be
at an end when the goods were placed on the wharf.
In Hitchtoe v. Oovill, 20 Wend. 167, we have this case. Hitchcoal', a merchai.t of the city of New York, sold goods to Graves,
44
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who resided at Willardsburg, in the State of Pennsylvania. Graves
directed the goods to be shipped on board a canal or lake boat,
bound to the village of Havana, N. Y. They were boxed and
directed to him, at Willardsburg, and put on board a canal boat,
which in due course arrived at Havana. The course of business
was to deposit goods brought by canal boats to Havana, (which
was then at the head of navigation in the direction of Willardsburg,)
in a warehouse there, where they remained until sent for by the
owners .atWillardsburg. Immediately after the goods in question
had been deposited in the warehouse, Covill, as sheriff, seized them
under an execution against Graves. The distance between Havana
and Willardsburg was upwards of thirty miles. Four days after
the goods had been placed in the warehouse, Graves came on with
his team to take them away.
The Supreme Court was of opinion that the transit was at an
end when the goods reached Havana and were landed.
In the Court of Errors, a different view was taken, chiefly, if not
solely, upon the assumption that the warehouse-man was a middle
man between the vendor and vendee, and whilst the goods remained
in his charge, the right of stoppage existed. It is unnecessary for
us to examine whether the facts of the case warrant this inference.
The Court of Errors thought they did, and if so, the transit was
certainly not complete.
There is nothing, therefove, in this decision, which militates at
all with the principle of Dixon v. Baldwin. Indeed, the court in
express terms declares that Dixon v. Baldwin "was rightly decided," p. 613.
Judgment is to be entered for the plaintiffs in the manner mentioned in the case stated.

